And, rightly, all policy documents of the German government on Africa emphasize the importance of creating peace and security as well as promoting democracy, human rights and the rule of law. Unfortunately, the personal and material resources invested so far in these policy areas have been marginal.

Germany in Nepad and G8 Africa
There is, however, a very recent development which might mark the politicization of Germany’s African policy – that promises a shifting of focus from a technocratically- orientated development policy to a comprehensive approach of stabilizing the region and improving its access to, as well as its competitiveness, in the world market. Nepad and the G8-Africa Action Plan could represent the two building blocks of this new orientation. Germany was among those G8 countries which saw Nepad as an excellent opportunity to lift the relations between Africa and the North on to a different level. From the beginning, German decision makers in African policy emphasized that Nepad’s significance does not lie in its instrumentalization as a pledging document by some African states but in its political content. Logically, Germany insisted on a political response to Nepad which the G8 Africa Action Plan mainly is. Germany engaged intensively in the G8’s efforts to draft the plan. It accepted the responsibility for preparing one chapter – trade and investment – though this was not the chapter it was interested in at most. In the beginning it had volunteered for the chapter peace and security which was finally taken over by the UK.

The reason for Germany’s initial resistance to a topic which would seem to suit a trade nation well was twofold. First there was the realization that it is difficult to start new political initiatives in a policy field so much dominated by multilateral institutions and determined by international agreements. With regard to trade, the European G8 countries did not have any mandate to go beyond the EU’s offers in the Cotonou Agreement and the Everything-but-arms Initiative as well as its positions in the WTO-process. This especially concerned the area of agriculture in which Germany takes a more conciliatory position than some of its European partners. In addition, the US was not willing to discuss the issue of its agricultural subsidies in the context of the G8 Africa Action Plan. On investment, Germany

holds the view that it is mainly up to the African countries to create favorable conditions for foreign investment. There is no means for the German government to urge or even force German companies to rearrange their investment portfolios for the benefit of sub-Saharan Africa. Nevertheless, Germany sees possibilities to support African efforts in improving the investment climate in the region by conducive economic policies and an upgraded physical infrastructure – as is stated in the G8 Africa Action Plan.

Germany’s lack of enthusiasm about being assigned responsibility for the trade and investment chapter also has a positive explanation: its interest in matters of peace and security. Right after its formation in 1998, the Red-Green coalition declared conflict prevention a central focus of its foreign policy especially toward the south. The events in the Balkans and of September 11th forced the government to concentrate more on conflict management and resolution than prevention as well as on military aspects of conflict management rather than civilian ones. This of course, conflicts with the attitudes and convictions of the majority of the ruling coalition’s electorate. The Chancellor’s difficulties in assuring a coalition majority for passing a parliamentary resolution on the deployment of troops to Macedonia and Afghanistan signifies that. For the government or at least a part of it, the existing and potential conflicts in Africa seem to offer the chance to re-emphasize the commitment to conflict prevention by mainly civilian means. Therefore, the chancellor’s representatives prioritize the “peace and security” chapter, followed by the governance chapter, in the implementation of the G8 Africa Action Plan. They have done this so far in close cooperation with initially responsible British representatives. But Germany’s engagement in ensuring peace and security in Africa is not only motivated by domestic considerations. It has also a very weighty foreign policy component for some of Germany’s decision makers in this field: by dealing with conflicts in Africa they hope to achieve further progress in their efforts to reach an equal eye-level with the so-called P3, the Western permanent members of the security council: US, UK and France.

It is too early to tell whether this new enthusiasm for conflict prevention in Africa, induced, by domestic and foreign policy considerations will actually constitute a long-term and manifest shift in Germany’s Africa policy. The conservative and technocratic forces in the German development co-operation policy might be too strong for endowing the new approach with the necessary personal and material resources.It is possible that the whole policy might be scrapped by a differently composed coalition government and the credibility of Germany’s engagement in conflict prevention in Africa might be questioned by the world at large if it does not show any willingness to deploy troops to peace-keeping or even peace-enforcement missions in the region. The aftermath of September 11th and the potential effects of state failure in Africa on Europe’s security might, however, be the decisive factors for a long-term and sustained engagement of Germany in conflict prevention in Africa.